




# Economic Optimization of Innovation and Risk

AIAA Symposium | System Engineering  
Robert Shuler | May 17, 2013



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# Goals of Presentation

- **Introduce engineers to risk compensation**
    - Generally engineers are not expected to read economics & psychology journals
    - Relation to other theories and existing practices
    - Striking and large examples of unexpected outcomes
  - **Present a quantitative equation for optimization**
    - More appealing and useful to engineers than vague psych/econ theories
    - Quantitative rationale for reliability decisions, including some post-Columbia actions
    - Summary of derivation, details are in paper – <http://mc1soft.com/papers>
  - **Brief tutorial on applying the equation**
    - Discuss a few of the examples in terms of equation parameters
    - Exercise: decision / alternatives on a hypothetical space project  
*commercial passenger carrier for an orbital tourism / hotel facility*
-

quant safety goals not  
pted bec of uncertainty in  
calculations  
estimates of catastrophic  
ure so high would threaten  
critical viability of programs

# Background Theories

## • Risk Analysis

(Asipu 3200 BC, max release scenario for Nuc. Pwr. 1950s, probabilistic assessment post 1967 Apollo fire)

- Engineering / Statistical hypothesis – combination of estimated probabilities of failure  
*assumes a fixed mission profile (i.e. user behavior does not change – typically to an engine)*  
*“human factors” means clarity and usability of controls, etc.)*

## • Risk Management

(de Mere, Pascal, Fermat, Bernoulli, de Moivre, Bayes from 17<sup>th</sup> century, Markowitz 1952)

- Management hypothesis – identification, assessment & prioritization of risks  
*transfer, avoid, reduce or accept – assumes user behaves only as legally constrained*
- Includes insurance, futures & derivatives, e.g. pre-sale of farm crops

## • Risk Compensation

(Peltzman 1975)

- Economic hypothesis – humans & organizations optimize economic value  
*risk may partly adjust when an improvement is made*

## • Risk Homeostasis

(Wilde 1982)

- Psychological hypothesis – humans adjust behavior to maintain risk level  
*improvement is wasteful*

pre-2008 ratings of Mortgage-Backed Securities & Credit Default Swaps

NASA barred by law from using most strategies – insurance, futures, derivatives

Seatbelts do save but not as many as

More aggressive driving with anti-lock brakes – a condoms, bike helmets, skydiving



# Unexpected Outcomes

## TRAFFIC SAFETY

- **Montana No-Speed-Limit 1995-1999**

- After 4 years, Montana recorded its historical low of number of accidents on affected roadways

[http://www.hwysafety.com/hwy\\_montana.htm](http://www.hwysafety.com/hwy_montana.htm)

- Since then accident rates have begun to rise again
- German Autobahn accident rates are lower than USA rates

- **No-Fault Auto Insurance**

- Leads to 6% increase in traffic fatalities

*Cohen & Dehijia, J. of Law & Economics 2004*

- **Seat Belts vs. Air Bags**

*Levitt & Porter, Rev. of Econ. & Stat. 2001*


Seat Belts

**Cost per life saved:**

\$30k

Air Bags

\$1.8M





# Unexpected Outcomes



## LARGE GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS

### • War on Drugs – “Just Say No” – DARE

- Pioneered in 1970s by Richard Evans at University of Houston
  - Nancy Regan phrase 1982
- Testing by marketing experts shows:
  - “Just Say No” increased teen interest in drugs after exposure, promotes idea that other teens are using drugs – *usage has increased!*
  - DARE messages from police / authority not as effective as peer messages, e.g. publication of actual drinking statistics near dorms/frats on college campus *reduced* drinking

#### Costs:

- Over \$1 trillion & hundreds of thousands of lives
- \$33 billion for “Just Say No”, \$20 billion to fight in home countries, Columbia violence moved to Mexico, now directly affecting border regions and tourism, \$121 billion to arrest and \$450 billion to incarcerate *non-violent* offenders



wiki/List\_of\_countries\_by\_incarceration\_rate per 100,000

1. USA	716
5. Rwanda	527
8. Russian Federation	502
92. United Kingdom	151
123. China	120

Behavioral, economic & possibly biologic factor


# Unexpected Outcomes

## LARGE GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS #2

### • War on Cancer

- Begun by Nixon in 1971
  - Inspired by successful Moon program
  - Promised cure by 1976

Some economic factors may be involved -  
but clearly a technically difficult problem



NYT "Advances..." 4/23/2009

Change in death rate or incidence:


Cancer -5% death rate (since 1970s)

Heart disease -64% death rate (since 1970s)

Flu & Pneumonia -58% death rate (since 1970s)

Smoking <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0762370.html> -54% incidence (since 1960s)

Illegal drug use <http://www.umsl.edu/~keelr/180/trends.html> +6% incidence (since 2002)



# Unexpected Outcomes

## MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES



- **Commercial Air Transportation**

- People will pay more for safety in the air – *Carlsson 2002*
- Consumers learn about unobservable safety from flight outcomes – *Hartmann 2001*
  - Accidents adversely affect demand for other carriers
  - Airlines profits are greater if they are able to choose their optimal maintenance provision
  - Airlines AND consumers prefer an independent safety certification rather than an FAA minimum *makes it more profitable to provide additional maintenance*

- **Fire Safety Blankets**

- For a long time mainly used in USA, *but USA has highest fire fighter death rate*
  - USDA Forest Service concern about entrapment risk with improved 2003 fire shelter, *developed with NASA he*
- July 2005 British Columbia *bans use of fire shelters to prevent entrapment*



- **Nuclear Energy**

**8 million lives already  
saved by nuclear energy!**


<i>type of energy</i>	<i>fatalities</i>	<i>% of world electricity</i>
Nuclear	<u>5163 total</u>	<u>12.3% from 437 pla</u>
Fossil fuels	<u>300,000 per year</u>	<u>69.4%</u>



# Axioms & Approximations

- Use linear approximations

- Equation will certainly be valid about an operating point:
- May or may not work well for large deltas



- Cost of innovation axiom: (*equilibrium condition*)

- Corporations will engage in *innovation* (adding Features, new models, etc.) until there is no incremental profit  $P_F$  from doing so
- Subsume all costs in  $P_F$  except cost of the crash rate  $C_R$
- $P_F - C_R = 0 \Rightarrow C_R = P_F$
- Similar in concept to marginal utility of safety (Spence 1975, Savage 1999)

- Development Crash Rate approximation

- Divide development cost  $C_{dev}$  by problem (bug) rate  $R_d$  to get cost per development bug  $C_d$
- To get total feature cost add manufacturing  $C_F \approx C_d R_d + M$
- Rewrite:  $R_d \approx (C_F - M)/C_d$

Agrees with our experience that hardware ( $M > 0$ ) has fewer bugs in development than software ( $C_d$ )

# Axioms & Approximations

CONTINUED...

- **Operational Crash Rate approximation**

- Use the concept of **Defect ratio** (defect leakage through testing process)
  - Not applicable to component wear/fatigue, but those processes are already well understood
  - Most modern failures are latent design or procedural issues:
    - All software failures, Fukushima reactor, Boeing 787 battery, Deepwater Horizon blowout, both Shuttle losses, etc.
    - Treat procedures like software, i.e. latent design issues (design of the procedure, or design of enforcement)
    - Even fatigue failures become latent design issues, i.e. they should have been caught by inspection / maintenance procedures
- It follows that the operational failure rate is the development bug rate times D:  
 $R_O \approx DR_d$  (use consistent units – per hour, flight, device, etc.)
- Substituting for  $R_d$  we have  $R_O \approx (C_F - M)D/C_d$  or  $C_F \approx R_OC_d/D + M$
- Gives a relationship between operational failure rate  $R_O$  and cost of features  $C_F$ 
  - Now we can apply our equilibrium condition – the cost of innovation axiom

Note: our previous observations about development bug rate  
now apply to operational failures ~  
more expensive development process  $\Rightarrow$  lower the crash rate  
more valuable features  $\Rightarrow$  more failures

# The Crash Rate Model

- *First, a profit axiom*

- Economic utility (Value) to users of the given Feature set:  $V_F$
- Seller/producer will set *price* =  $V_F$  to maximize profit:  $P_F = V_F - C_F$

- *Combine previous axioms & solve for crash rate:*

- Apply the innovation axiom to get cost of crash crashes (failures):  $C_R = V_F - C_F$
- Use operational crash rate axiom to replace  $C_F$ :  $C_R = V_F - (R_O C_d / D + M)$
- Solve for crash rate:  $R_O \approx (V_F - M - C_R) D / C_d$
- Express crash costs as cost per crash  $C_C = C_R / R_O$

- $\Rightarrow R_O \approx \frac{V_F - M}{C_C + C_d / D}$

High value, easily produced features encourage more use and more risk taking  $\Rightarrow$  high  $R_O$

cost per failure (e.g. air nuclear)  $\Rightarrow$  conservative & careful use, low  $R_O$

High development costs lower crash rate



Verification, inspection analysis & quality control multiply the effect even if they are cheap



# The Crash Rate Model

## EXPLAINS:

How 6-sigma reliability helped Japanese automakers become largest in world (low "D")

- Now virtually all cars will go 200,000 miles

- After 20 years of competitive evolution, Japan has lost this advantage

How Boeing, ATT & IBM dominated with expensive but reliable products (high M &  $C_C$ )

Why you may not want to take a "fast-tracked" drug ( $C_d$  too low, D too high?)

Why your PC and phone crash a lot and are subject to hacker attacks

(high  $V_F$ , low everything else)

- Use operational crash rate axiom to replace  $C_F$ :  $C_R = V_F - (R_O C_d / D + M)$

- Solve for crash rate:  $R_O \approx (V_F - M - C_R) D / C_d$

- Express crash costs as cost per crash  $C_C = C_R / R_O$

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Verification, inspection analysis & quality control multiply the effect even if they are cheap

# The Bad News

$$R_O \approx \frac{V_F - M}{C_C + C_d /}$$

- **Competitive equilibrium**

- The formula assumes operation at the optimal profit point
  - If a company does not operate there, it will be acquired or bankrupted because *others have more money*
- By culture, contracting, employee rotation & use of the same management consultants, *Government generally operates close to the same point as industry*
  - We have seen many administrations pledge to make “Government as efficient as industry”

- **Data may be unavailable for D during development,  $V_F$  for gov’t programs (i.e. profit)**

- **The Good News**

- It *may be* possible to shortcut 20+ years of trial and error and choose a “good” operating point – but we must learn how to react to new data

1979 Honda Civic



[www.uniquecarsandparts.com.au/car\\_spotters\\_guide\\_japan\\_1979.htm](http://www.uniquecarsandparts.com.au/car_spotters_guide_japan_1979.htm)

1979 Chevy Nova



<http://www.detailshop.com/rides.php>



# Application to Examples

$$R_O \approx \frac{V_F - M}{C_C + C_d /}$$

- **Montana speed limit?**

- Perception of greater risk (high  $R_O$ ) from
  - Bad crashes with speeding driver, high  $C_C$
  - Greater risk of crash due to other driver's high  $D$  (errors)
- Greater cognitive awareness of all risk factors vs. posted speeds which are considered by drivers to be conservative

- **No-fault auto insurance?**

- Reduced  $C_C$  to driver, due to better insurance coverage and lack of fault penalties

- **Seat belt and air bag effects?**

- Perceived slightly lower cost  $C_C$  (damage) from crashes when buckled
  - Relative to incorrectly perceived lower than actual risk/cost of unbuckled driving
- Incorrect perception of near-immunity to  $CC$  with air bags, most crashes not head on
  - i.e. bags are of almost no value unless buckled up, and most of the protection comes from the belts



# Application to Examples

$$R_O \approx \frac{V_F - M}{C_C + C_d / D}$$

- **War on drugs?**

- Add supply-focused enforcement to cost of M
- $V_F$  made higher by erroneous “just say no” commercials
- User  $C_C$  made lower by medical advances and free emergency room ruling

- **War on cancer?**

- $D \approx 1$  due to lack of a cure (all defects become operational defects)
- Perceived  $V_F$  rises as hope for cure persuades people to undertake expensive treatment

- **Air transportation?**

- $C_C$  is high and perceived higher (lottery effect, disaster avoidance effect)
- $D$  is very low due to independent certification & investigation
- Dependence of  $V_F$  on  $R_O$ , value of high risk airline or airplane drops to zero

# Application to Examples

CONTINUED

$$R_O \approx \frac{V_F - M}{C_C + C_d / D}$$

- **Fire safety blankets?**

- Incorrect perception of low  $C_C$  of entrapment

- **Nuclear energy?**

- Perceived extraordinarily high  $C_C$  of failure
- Low  $D$  for same reasons as air transport

- **Shuttle orbiter?**

- $V_F$  is not directly measureable for non-profit space projects – perhaps use total cost
- $C_d$  and  $D$  are not known from easily accessible public records
  - Large testing costs applied to engines, avionics, tiles with many testing defects corrected high  $C_d/D$
  - SRBs and foam were considered mature (low testing?) and many operational defects were ignored (high  $D$ )
- Formula is meant to analyze a change (delta)
  - After 1986, military & commercial dropped – presumably  $V_F$  lower, change in  $R_O$  from 1/50 to 1/84 (nearly double)
  - In 1986 change from quasi-military crew to civilian (teacher) – no re-look at  $R_O$  – compare to WWII bombing runs
  - Between planning and ops there was a 100 to 1 reduction in flight rate – how would this affect  $R_O$ ?



We will analyze this  
in the exercise – next

# Project Manager Exercise:

$$R_o \approx \frac{V_F - M}{C_C + C_d /}$$

- Commercial transport to orbital hotel / tourism facility

- Goal is to sell tickets at  $V_F = \$1$  million with recurring  $M < \$750k$  per passenger
  - Using next generation SpaceX reusable launcher  $20x <$  cost of current  $\$133M$  for Dragon 7-passenger vehicle
  - 10 passenger reusable transport, dev cost  $\$250M$ , 2 copies
  - 1 flight a week gives  $10 \times 50 \times 250k = \$250M/yr$  net revenue
  - Passengers sign waiver of liability but this is not expected to hold up in case of vehicle systems failure
  - At-fault accident liability estimated at  $\$1B$  and no one will insure at reasonable price
- Hotel & investors insist  $R_o \ll 1 / 5$  years to guarantee profits after liability
  - 1 / 25 years would be 1 / 1250 flights, still 1000x more risky than a 1000 mile auto trip (1 fatal crash / 100M m
- Testing program
  - 10 test flights, revealing 5 major but not fatal problems, giving  $C_d = \$50M$
  - You are confident from risk analysis and test results that  $D < .1$  (one more problem in another 10 flights)

$$R_o \approx \frac{\$1M - .75}{\$1B + \$50M / .1} = \frac{.25M}{1.5B} = \frac{1}{6000}$$

seems like a pretty good number



Crisis:  $R_o \approx \frac{\$1M - .75}{\$1B + \$50M / .1} = \frac{.25M}{1.5B} = \frac{1}{6000}$   $R_o \approx \frac{V_F - M}{C_C + C_d /}$

- After  $R_o$  publication & failure of a competing spacecraft:

- Oops, that's only 600 flights, with a crash expected every 12 years
- Ticket sales top out at 100 due to perceived risk, the venture will fail
- Hedge fund offers to rescue company, alter ticket price to \$5M
  - 10 flights / year, revenue of \$500M, mostly profit
- Founder asks you...
  - What is risk of hedge fund plan?
  - How much money do you need to meet original goal of 25 year crash interval expectancy?

$$R_o \approx \frac{\$5M - .75}{\$1B + \$50M / .1} = \frac{4.25M}{1.5B} = \frac{1}{353}$$

Due to low flight rate and high financial pressure on each flight n plan expects crashes every 3.5 years

$$R_o \approx \frac{\$.95M - .75}{\$1B + \$70M / .05} = \frac{.2M}{2.4B} = \frac{1}{12000}$$



Spend another \$100M for 10 test flights (total 20) and if no problems, D < . & reduce ticket price \$50k



S/W Air, one of the lowest ticket price carriers, is also one of the safest

# Caveats:

$$R_O \approx \frac{V_F - M}{C_C + C_d /}$$

- Linear approximation range may be violated in this example
  - Still extremely useful for detecting *direction* of change and *incremental amount of change*
- Static equilibrium equation only
  - Does not consider dynamics (speed), but humans respond remarkably fast, consider aviation inferences
  - All eggs in one basket equation, portfolio (Markowitz) approach unused by NASA since early 80s
- Determination of D is not statistically valid
  - Infeasible to mount thousands of large missions
  - Use engineering analysis & inference methods along with independent verification [next slide]

$$R_O \approx \frac{\$5M - .75}{\$1B + \$50M / .1} = \frac{4.25M}{1.5B} = \frac{1}{353}$$

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


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# A Methodology Suggestion

HOW TO APPLY "SMARTS" EFFECTIVELY


$$R_O \approx \frac{V_F - M}{C_C + C_d /}$$



# Conclusions:

$$R_O \approx \frac{V_F - M}{C_C + C_d /}$$

- Provides insight into effects such as mission frequency and testing
  - Economic theory (supply curve, more is more difficult) is at odds with Engineering experience (learning curve)
- Needed to provide rapid adaptation to new technology
  - 20 years is too long to “gain experience” with current & proposed rates of introduction of new technologies
- Cheap vehicles need many test flights to lower D
  - Expensive verification is incompatible with the concept “cheap” – relying on  $C_C$  restricts value of missions  $V_F$
  - Alternative (used in the exercise) is to get D very low, taking advantage of the low cost of missions for verification
  - Need a way to account for distribution of severity of defects (often logarithmic, e.g. earthquakes, foam loss?)



# Summary of Engineering Effects

